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Abstract The recent housing crisis has raised the important question of whether consumers 
are making appropriate decisions when it comes to various mortgage options. Specifically, do 
consumers know when to choose an adjustable rate mortgage versus a fixed rate mortgage? 
Further, does additional mortgage disclosure help consumers make the correct decision? This 
study uses unique data in a 2x2 experimental design in which some participants were randomly 
assigned to receive a Federal Reserve Board document containing information explaining the 
difference between these two major mortgage types. Participants were then given two distinct 
scenarios, one where an adjustable and one where a fixed rate mortgage is more appropriate. 
Path analysis is used to determine the probability of consumers making the correct decision in 
both scenarios. The results suggest that receiving a mortgage information disclosure document 
does indeed make a difference in consumers selecting the most appropriate mortgage type. 23% 
of those who did not receive mortgage information correctly chose the most appropriate 
mortgage for both scenarios while 36% correctly answered both after receiving the mortgage 
education information, a 57% increase.  Factors such as overall financial knowledge and Truth in 
Lending Act comprehension are also important predictors of choosing the correct mortgage type.  
Not all consumers who were exposed to financial information made the correct decision which 
supports the continued use of mortgage counselors and or educational programs to further assist 
consumers in selection the best mortgage type for their situation. 
1 Introduction  
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Beginning in 2008 signs of a housing crisis began as foreclosure rates increased leading to the 
end of the decades long growth of home values in the United States, and thus changing the 
financial outlook of many families. In 1990 the delinquency rate of mortgage payments, as 
calculated by the Census (2012), was 4.7% growing to 9.3% in 2010. The trend between 2000 
and 2010 was even more stark as the delinquency rate for prime conventional loans went from 
2.3% to 6.5%, and from 11.9% to 25.9% for subprime loans (Census 2012). 
One question that still needs to be addressed is why so many households took on such 
mortgage types that appeared to be suboptimal such as choosing an adjustable rate mortgage 
(ARM) when a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) would have been more appropriate.  Different 
mortgage types can be advantageous in various situations; nonetheless, the subprime market 
emphasized less on conventional FRM, and instead transferred interest rate risk to consumers. In 
some instances, homeownership education was required to qualify for some of these loans. Yet, 
with this approach, perhaps some consumers saw this as a necessary requirement, and the timing 
of such information was not optimal to influence their decision. Further, many courses do not 
require a test of such knowledge resulting in many consumers not truly understanding different 
types of mortgages and their implications on things such as family budgets.  
This study examines whether consumers typically understand in which situation it is 
appropriate to utilize a FRM and an ARM. This study utilizes a 2x2 experimental design in 
which some participants were randomly assigned to a treatment group who received a Federal 
Reserve Board document (Federal Reserve Board, 2009) outlining basic financial information 
highlighting the differences between a FRM and an ARM.  This document is readily available 
online but is not part of the required disclosure when choosing a mortgage or purchasing a home. 
Both the treatment and control groups were presented two scenarios, and were asked to select the 
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type of mortgage most appropriate for each, independently. Therefore the first level of the 
experimental design distinguishes those who receive the treatment while the second stage is 
whether they selected the mortgage type correctly. The purpose of the experiment is to help 
determine whether such a treatment can lead to better decision-making in hypothetical mortgage 
scenarios.  For many, the home buying decision process may be stressful, and may result in 
decisions that are deemed not rational or optimal.  Due to the hypothetical nature of the scenarios 
in this study, the stressful aspect of the process is eliminated to test if, based only on the 
mortgage information provided, a consumer is able to make the most appropriate mortgage 
selection.  This may provide greater insight into the role information plays in influencing choice. 
The results may be useful in informing future policy or even best practices for deciding required 
homeownership information or education programs that would better prepare potential borrowers 
for selecting the appropriate type of mortgage.   
2.1 Information and knowledge 
2.1.1 Mortgage specific knowledge 
More precisely in the context of mortgage choice, financial illiteracy has been associated with 
financial mistakes such as excessive borrowing or high-cost mortgages selection (Bucks and 
Pence 2008; Lusardi and Mitchelli 2007; Moore 2003). Furthermore, those mortgage holders 
who exhibit a higher level of financial, and mortgage knowledge are able to take advantage of 
current market opportunities such as mortgage refinance during a stage of decreasing interest 
rates (Campbell 2006).  
 Additionally, other studies have documented that specific financial knowledge in credit, 
mortgage, and interest rates should result in better financial decisions. For instance, evidence 
suggests that individuals who are able to understand and compute the interest rates of financial 
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obligations are more prone to make better borrowing decisions (Stango and Zinman 2007). 
Consistent with these findings, excessive amounts of debt and deficient borrowing choices are 
linked to individuals who display a poor understanding of the power of interest accruing on both 
principal and interest, and disregard its implications in their financial decisions (Lusardi and 
Mitchelli 2007; Lusardi and Tufano 2009).  We hypothesize that participants who receive the 
Federal Reserve Board document outlining the difference between a FRM and an ARM will be 
more likely to choose the most appropriate mortgage in both scenarios. 
2.1.2 TILA knowledge and information 
Lack of information can undoubtedly lead to making wrong choices. The Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) is one of the two enacted federal laws in the mortgage market that aims to help consumer 
make more informed choice through obligatory disclosures. TILA mandates lenders disclose 
information about credit costs and term—e.g. annual percentage rate (APR) and finance charge 
(Lee and Hogarth 1999). But research studies show that the mandatory TILA disclosures could 
be cumbersome and extensive, resulting in information overload for consumers (Durkin and 
Elliehausen 1990; Thakor et al. 1993). Thus, for the purpose of this study, we are concerned with 
how effectively consumers can process TILA information, and actually use it when making 
mortgage selection. We hypothesize that participants who have higher TILA comprehension are 
more likely to choose the most appropriate mortgage in both scenarios. 
2.1.3 General financial literacy 
According to Lusardi (2008), financial literacy impacts financial decision-making. Poor 
borrowing decisions and behaviors are connected to lack of knowledge of basic financial 
concepts. Additionally, Kozup and Hogarth (2008) highlight the importance of financial 
education and its respective role on making optimal financial decisions relative to individuals’ 
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goals, needs, and values.  Earlier studies had shown a positive link between improved credit use 
and management, and increased financial knowledge. Those individuals with higher financial 
literacy scores are more likely to follow suggested financial practices (Cude et al. 2006; Hilgert 
et al. 2003; Hogarth and Hilgert 2002). Several studies support that financial education, provided 
through financial counseling or intervention, can affect behavior (Bernheim and Garrett 2003; 
Clark and D'Ambrosio 2008; Lusardi 2002).  We hypothesize that participants who score higher 
in the general financial knowledge quiz are more likely to choose the most appropriate mortgage 
in both scenarios. 
2.2 Social Learning 
Social learning is also an influential component in the process of decision-making.  Danes (1994) 
explains that financial socialization is the process through which individuals obtain and develop 
beliefs, behaviors, knowledge, and norms that shape future financial behaviors and decisions. 
Various agents such as parents, school, media, professional, and others can serve as the 
socialization means. For example, Cho et al. (2012) explore the impact of financial socialization 
on the financial practices of low and moderate-income households. The study finds that two 
main agents of financial capitalization are parents and financial planners. The role of parents can 
suggest that in addition to different levels of resources, differences in social learning 
opportunities can influence preferences and subsequent behaviors (Gutter et al. 2010).  We 
hypothesize that participants who grew up in a home with a mortgage will be more likely to 
correctly to choose the most appropriate mortgage in both scenarios 
2.3 Personal psychology and Social Cognitive Preferences  
Risk tolerance is another influential determinant in the mortgage decision-making process. 
According to Campbell and Cocco (2003), households with lower risk aversion, more stable 
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labor income, and higher probability of mobility should be inclined to select ARMs. Coulibaly 
and Li (2009) explore further the determinants of the choice between FRM and ARM by using 
1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, a highly comprehensive data set for 
the purposes of mortgage choice. Consistent with previous findings, they confirm that borrowers 
who exhibit a higher level of risk aversion, have risky labor income, and are less likely to move 
in the short-run should tend to prefer FRMs. Furthermore, the study highlights a unique finding 
related to the importance of risk factors: attitudes toward risk notably affects the mortgage 
decision making process. For borrowers who display lower levels of risk aversion, affordability 
does not significantly impact mortgage choice; and income volatility and other pricing variable 
are less deterministic in this process than for more risk-averse borrowers. A more recent study 
(Mori et al. 2009) examines the psychological factors on why borrowers lean toward ARMs by 
testing a formulated hypothesis derived from Prospect Theory—which suggests individuals may 
frame gains and losses differently (Kahneman and Taversky 1979). The study (Mori et al. 2009) 
finds that risk-averse individuals will most likely choose ARMs in situation where the expected 
outcomes are negative, and under conditions of uncertainty; thus, becoming more risk tolerant as 
they accept to seek more risk. Factors in the psychological spectrum might explicate why in the 
context of mortgage-choice borrower would ponder more weight in pricing factors, rather than 
risk factors associated with ARMs.  
Another factor under the umbrella of the psychological aspect of consumer’ decision-
making process is past experience and/or personal history. More specifically, this factor is 
classified as social-cognitive determinant. Consumers’ past experience can significantly impact 
the decision making process. Several research studies examine how the particular personal 
history of an individual can play a key role and influential factor in future decisions. Juliusson et 
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al. (2005) explain that individuals are more prone to respond similarly, and arrive at the same 
verdict in situations that they have previously perceived a positive outcome from making a 
similar decision. Conversely, Sagi and Friedland (2007) demonstrate that individuals try to 
prevent to make decisions that in the past resulted in mistakes or failures. In many 
circumstances, though, the fact that potential decisions would be based on the learning of past 
experience does not guaranteed that the decision would be the best or optimal  
2.4 Financial Position 
Income has been shown to be a significant influence upon mortgage choice (Leece 2004). In fact, 
early studies on mortgage selection highlight the importance of level of income in this process. 
Brueckner and Follain (1988) conclude that level of income, and its expected growth path are 
significantly related to selecting a type of mortgage. Other research studies consider the notion of 
level of income by employing mortgage affordability, a more comprehensive variable, which in 
conjunction with risk exposure influence the choice of mortgage type, particularly among ARMs 
with different adjustment periods (Leece 2004). 
2.5 Demographics 
In the mortgage context, with a few exceptions (Sa-Aadu and Megbolugbe 1995; Sa-Aadu and 
Shilling 1994; Sa-Aadu and Sirmans 1995) borrower characteristics have been less successful in 
explaining the choice of mortgage (Leece 2004), and if so the influence is relatively weak (Mori 
et al. 2009). Nevertheless, this study controls for age, gender, formal education, and race as 
possible factors influencing mortgage choice 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Sample and experimental design 
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The target sample for this group was lower-to-middle income families. In order to obtain the 
sample for a web-based survey, Survey Sampling International (SSI) was employed. SSI retains 
panels throughout the world; for our study, this was limited to the United States. Members of the 
panels joined knowing they would be asked to participate in a survey research.   
 The first level of the 2x2 experiment was established when the research team created two 
versions of the survey. One that contained mortgage education information
1
, which is identified 
as the treatment; and one that did not, identified as the control. SSI was given the links to both 
versions of the survey. They then randomly assigned participants to one of the two groups, and 
sent them the appropriate link in early 2012.  The second level of the 2x2 experiment asked 
participants to choose either a conventional FRM or an ARM for two independent scenarios. For 
each scenario, participants were told to assume that the interest rates were appropriately 
competitive, and that a person would be approved for either type of mortgage.  The scenarios are 
provided in Appendix A. In the first scenario one could see that an ARM is appropriate, while a 
conventional FRM was the clear choice in the second scenario.  Thus, the dependent variable is 
determined based upon the mortgage type selected. For each scenario, the more appropriate 
mortgage type was deemed as the correct mortgage option.  The dependent variable thus consists 
of possibilities: answering both scenarios correctly, answering neither scenario correctly, 
choosing the ARM for both scenarios, and choosing the FRM for both scenarios.  T-tests were 
administered to check for differences in means between the treatment, and control group for each 
variable resulting in no differences at the 1% or 5% level (results available from authors upon 
request). 
                                                          
1
The Federal Reserve Board Consumer Protection Resources Fixed vs. Adjustable Rate Mortgages Document 
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 SSI fielded the study with repeat efforts until the desired sample of 500 was reached. 
Incomplete surveys were omitted from our final sample, resulting in a sample of 480. This was 
split into 235 (49%) for the treatment group and 245 (51%) for the control group.  
3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Information and knowledge 
The treatment and control group are differentiated if they received the aforementioned Federal 
Reserve Board document outlining some of the basic differences between a FRM and an ARM.  
This mortgage specific knowledge is an indicator variable of 1 or 0.   
 All respondents were presented with a two page Truth in Lending Act document (see 
appendix B) with simulated values, which were comparable to what an actual homebuyer would 
see in an actual TILA document.  The document provided the respondent with all of the relevant 
statement of loan terms such as: loan amount, loan term, estimated settlement charges, 
prepayment penalty, annual percentage rate, a table showing potential changes in interest rate 
and payment associated with an ARM etc. Even though anyone taking out a mortgage is required 
to receive a TILA document, actual TILA comprehension is unknown.  Respondents were then 
given five questions to test their knowledge on the information received in this document (see 
Appendix C).  A respondent’s comprehension was based on the number of questions answered 
correctly ranging from zero to five forming our TILA comprehension variable with a higher 
score indicating better mastery of the material.  
 A general financial knowledge variable consisted of 6 questions created by Mandell 
(2008) in an attempt to gauge a respondent’s financial knowledge. There was one question in 
each of the following categories: credit, inflation protection, credit report access, loan interest 
rate, APR, and risk and return (see appendix D).  Unlike with the TILA comprehension 
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questions, no information was given to the participants to aid them. A respondent’s financial 
knowledge score was based on the number of questions answered correctly, and thus ranged 
from zero to six with a higher score indicating higher financial knowledge. 
3.2.2 Social learning 
In addition, a supplemental question was posed to gain insight into their exposure to 
homeownership decision-making making process.   This question asked participants if their 
parents were homeowners for some or most of their childhood.   
3.2.3 Personal psychology and social cognitive preferences 
The Grable and Lytton (1999) risk tolerance questionnaire that consists of 13 questions was used 
to estimate a participant’s risk tolerance.  From those 13 questions, respondents were categorized 
as having below average risk tolerance, average risk tolerance, or above average risk tolerance.  
Participants were also asked if they currently or ever had a mortgage coded 1 if they had and 0 if 
they had not. 
3.2.4 Financial position  
Respondents were asked of their household’s current income.  Income was a categorical variable 
with 6 categories;  less than $20,000, $20,001 to $40,000, $40,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to 
$70,000, $70,001 to $90,000, and greater than $90,000.  
3.2.5 Demographics  
Participants were asked for basic personal characteristics that are common preferences shifters in 
consumer decision-making models. Respondents were asked for their current age and gender. In 
addition, respondents were asked to choose the best fit for their race and ethnicity. The list 
included: White (non-Hispanic), African American/Black (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, Asian, or 
other.  Households were asked to state their highest level of school completed from the following 
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list: Less than high school degree, high school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED), currently in 
school, completed some college but no degree, associate degree, bachelor degree, or graduate 
degree. 
See Table 1 for the further independent variable description.  
3.3 The Path analysis model 
An advantage of path analysis over OLS is that a better fit pathway or connections can be 
inductively explored from initial hypotheses or theory.  To this end,  the four key variables of 
interests that we expect to impact the likelihood of a participant selecting the most appropriate 
mortgage in both selections is risk tolerance, financial knowledge, TILA  knowledge, and the 
treatment document.  Thus, these four variables had direct pathways to the dependent variables 
of answering both questions scenarios correctly.  It is expected that those with higher general 
financial knowledge will better be able to make financial decisions, in this case a mortgage 
decision.  Similarly it is expected that those who better understood the TILA document will 
better understand costs of a mortgage that will lead to making a better mortgage decision.  Those 
who received the treatment document should be most likely able to answer both mortgage 
questions as all the information needed to answer the questions are provided in the document.   
We believe that there is still a factor outside of knowledge that will influence participant’s 
mortgage decisions, namely risk tolerance.  Participants who have low risk tolerance may not be 
willing to select an adjustable rate mortgage in any situation, making them less likely to answer 
both scenarios correctly. 
 The dependent variable is examining whether a participant was able to answer both 
hypothetical mortgage scenarios correctly.  This results in a binary variable of correct or 
incorrect.  Due to the nature of path analysis, a binary dependent variable is not appropriate.  
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Therefore, the dependent variable is a continuous variable f2 derived from the probit regression. 
The sign of f2 is a predictor of whether a participant answered the scenarios correctly. 
The goal is to estimate the latent variable       β + ε in probit model, where ε ~ N(0, 1). Then 
the binary variable of correct or incorrect can be viewed as an indicator for whether this latent 
variable is positive:      
Therefore, the predictor of Y* can be derived from two parts:    ̂ and  ̂    In this model, X is risk 
tolerance, TILA comprehension, and financial knowledge.  The predicted value for the error term 
can be derived from the “residual” of the probit model   
 ̂      ̂ 
where Y is the decision the participant made which is either right or wrong (1/0).  Therefore, the 
dependent variable  f2 can be derived as follows:           ̂       ̂  
4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive characteristics  
Table 3 provides the results of the descriptive statistics. The majority of the respondents in the 
sample were white (80.8%) and had a mean age of 44.22 years. Education attainment, income, 
and consumer debt of the respondents had minimal variance across the respected categories.  
Females were a slight majority of the sample at 52%.  Of more interest is the information 
regarding knowledge.  After being presented with TILA information, the average TILA 
knowledge comprehension, out of 5, was 2.95. The average financial knowledge score was 3.46 
(out of 6).  23.67% of those who did not receive mortgage education information, the treatment 
in the experiment, correctly chose the most appropriate mortgage for both scenarios while 
36.17% correctly answered both after receiving the treatment (see Table 2).  15% of respondents 
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who did not receive the treatment were unsure of the most appropriate mortgage type compared 
to 6% who did receive the treatment. 
4.2 Path Analysis results 
Table 4 and Table 5 provide the pathways that have been established in this model.  All the 
pathways that were expected to be significant were significant, although the direction is not 
always as we expected.  Age, education, and  prior mortgage experience had positive effect on 
higher financial knowledge (P < .001).  Females, rather than males, had higher financial 
knowledge.  Having grown up in a household where parents were homeowners was also 
positively associated with higher TILA comprehension. 
As expected, higher financial knowledge led to higher TILA Comprehension, even after 
controlling for education level and prior mortgage experience, both of which were also positively 
associated with TILA comprehension. 
Two mediating effects were examined to check for indirect relationships between key variables 
and the predicted latent variable of answering the mortgage questions correctly.  TILA 
documentation being required disclosure in this process, we wanted to examine what effects 
TILA comprehension had on our treatment variable (figure 3) as well as financial knowledge 
(figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3 is an isolated view of this mediating effect from the model.  A bootstrap method was 
conducted to check for the significance of an indirect effect.  The indirect effect here is the 
product of the financial knowledge to TILA comprehension pathway coefficient and the TILA 
comprehension to the correct mortgage choice pathway coefficient.  The indirect effect is .126 
and it is significant (P <.01) so partial mediation exists.   The total effect of financial knowledge 
is the sum of the direct and indirect effect which is thus .566 (.44 + .126).  Financial knowledge 
is thus a driving factor in being able to correctly identify the most appropriate mortgage choice. 
 
Figure 4  
We were also interested in knowing if any mediating effects existed with regards to our 
treatment document.  Figure 4 is an isolated view examining this mediating effect from our 
model.  When a bootstrap method was conducted to examine this relationship, no mediating 
effect was found, only the direct effect the treatment has on answering the correct mortgage 
choice is significant.  This is important to note because if we found there was full mediation 
between these variables, that would indicate to us that there is no value in requiring this added 
treatment document to the mortgage selection process; that is to say that if it were fully mediated 
any added value the treatment document may have added was already being added by the TILA 
comprehension which is represented by an already required disclosure form.   We conclude that 
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the treatment document, on its own, does increase the probability that someone will be able to 
identify the most appropriate mortgage type.  
5 Conclusions, implications, and limitations 
The three financial knowledge and information variables proved significant in determining 
households who chose the most appropriate mortgage type for both of our housing scenarios.  
Receiving the treatment, the Federal Reserve Board Consumer Protection Resources Fixed vs. 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages document did help consumers make the most appropriate mortgage 
selection. Providing Truth in Lending information helped respondents make appropriate 
mortgage decisions but perhaps policy makers and educators can make this information easier to 
understand as an average score of 2.95 out of 5 indicates people are still confused even after 
reading the document and our results indicate that those with improved scores are more likely to 
choose the most appropriate mortgage.   Respondents with higher financial knowledge scores 
were more likely to choose the most appropriate mortgage indicating that more financial 
education would be beneficial which can be assisted based on efforts of policy makers, financial 
educators and financial planners. 
 One of the limitations to this study is that we do not know who in our sample is currently 
searching for a home.  A household that is preparing to make the financial decision to purchase a 
home may be more familiar with mortgage types even though we did try controlling for this by 
asking about their past or current mortgage experience and if home ownership is important. Such 
a person may have more arousal about the homeownership prospects that may lead to 
information search.   Furthermore, we are unsure if the respondent in our survey would be the 
person in the household who would be making the financial decision of which mortgage to 
select. 
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 This study has shown that information treatments, even a one-page disclosure can 
improve mortgage choice. It also suggests that many consumers may not full grasp all of the 
concepts and math associated with making mortgage decisions. This study used an experimental 
design, which is novel in exploring the role of financial education interventions in financial 
decision-making. Further studies focusing on additional critical consumer decisions should 
consider using similar efforts to explore the role of information and even choice framing.
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Appendix A. Scenarios  
 
Scenario 1: Jerome (age 31) and Sharon (age 31) are seeking to purchase their first home. 
Jerome is beginning his medical career with a 3 year residency. They are not fond of the 
town they will be living in and plan to move to another state following the end of his 
residency. Sharon is planning to work in retail management; she has several years of 
experience with large appliance stores. They have good credit history and are looking to 
purchase a $195,000 home and they will put $10,000 down. 
Scenario 2: Margaret and Max recently got remarried to each other. They have three children 
under 18 who will be l living with them. They have found a home in a good school district 
that they would like all of their children to matriculate from; the youngest would do so in 
about 14 years. Max has been a teacher for 5 years and Margaret owns her own store which 
has been in business for some time. The home costs $212,000; they would like to put 
$20,000 down. 
 
Appendix B. Truth-in-lending Act documents 
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Appendix C. Truth-in-lending Act quiz questions 
 
1. What will be the interest rate for the first 5 years of the ARM loan? 
 a) 7.59% 
 b) 8.875% 
 c) 6.875% 
 d) 5.49% 
2. Assuming you pay off the loan in 30 years (with the market rate not changing), how much 
interest and settlement charges would you pay on the ARM loan? 
 a) $589,385.69 
 b) $307,935.69 
 c) $200,000.00 
 d) $193,250.00 
3. If you paid the loan off early, refinanced, or sold the home, how much of a potential penalty 
would you pay up to? 
 a) $8,625.00 
 b) $2,000.00 
 c) $1,477.83 
 d) $4,000.00 
4. An escrow account is 
 a) To hold settlement charges 
 b) How to pay a balloon payment 
 c) Required for property taxes and insurance 
 d) fixed amount always to be paid by lender 
5. After the first 5 years of the loan, the maximum change to the interest rate for the life of the 
loan is 
 a) 6% 
 b) 2% 
 c) 5% 
 d) 6.99% 
Appendix D. Financial Knowledge Instrument 
1. Which of the following credit card users is likely to pay the GREATEST dollar amount 
in finance charges per year, if they all charge the same amount per year on their cards? 
 
a) Someone who always pays off their credit card bill in full shortly after it is received. 
b) Someone who only pays the minimum amount each month (%). 
c) Someone who pays at least the minimum amount each month, and more when they 
have more money. 
d) Someone who generally pays their card of in full, but occasionally will pay the 
minimum when they are short on cash. 
e) Don’t know 
 
2. Which of the following types of investment would best protect the purchasing power of a 
family’s savings in the event of a sudden increase in inflation? 
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a) Twenty-five year corporate bond. 
b) A house financed with a fixed rate mortgage. 
c) A 10-year bond issued by a corporation. 
d) A certificate of deposit at a bank. 
e) Don’t know. 
 
3. Which of the following statements best describes your right to check your credit history 
for accuracy? 
 
a) All credit records are the property of the U.S. Government and access is only 
available to the FBI and Lenders. 
b) You can only check your credit report for free if you are turned down for credit based 
on a credit report. 
c) Your credit report can be checked once a year for free. 
d) You cannot see your credit report. 
e) Don’t know. 
 
4. Which of the following loans is likely to carry the highest interest rate?  
 
a) Car loan 
b) A home equity loan 
c) A credit card loan 
d)  A student loan 
e) Don’t know 
 
5. Which of the following is TRUE about the annual percentage rate (APR)?  
 
a) APR is expressed as a percentage on a semi-annual basis. 
b) APR does not take into account all loan fees. 
c) APR is not an accurate measure of the interest paid over the life of the loan. 
d) APR should be used to compare loans. 
 
6. A high-risk and high-return investment strategy would be most suitable for:  
 
a) An elderly retired couple living on a fixed income.  
b) A middle­aged couple needing funds for their children’s education in two years. 
c) A young married couple without children. 
d) All of the above because they all need high returns.  
e) Don’t know. 
 
7. How comfortable do you feel with your knowledge about financial management? 
 
a) I do NOT know enough. 
b) I understand some of what I read. 
c) I know as much as I need to. 
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Table 1 Description of the variables 
 
Variables Description 
Information and knowledge variables 
Mortgage information   A treatment, 1=provided, 0=not provided 
TILA knowledge  Number of correct answers among 5 questions about TILA 
Financial knowledge  Number of correct answers among 6 questions about general financial knowledge 
 
    Social learning variable      
        Parents Homeowner                                                        Were your parent(s) or guardians homeowners for some or most of your childhood?  
                                                                                                 1= yes, 0=no 
 
 
    Personal psychology and Social cognitive Preference variables 
 
        Risk tolerance                                                                 13 items for risk tolerance (Grable & Lytton, 1999) 
        Personal experience                                                        Have you ever had a mortgage? 1=yes, 0=no         
   
    Financial position variables 
Household income 
Current household income, 
1= $0-20,000, 2= $20,001-40,000 3= $40,001-70,000, 4=$70,001 and up 
 
 
   Demographic variables 
        Age  How old are you currently?; coded continuously 
    Race 1=White, 0=other 
    Education 
1=less than high school degree & High school degree or equivalent 
2=currently in school & associate degree 
3= completed some college but no degree  
4= Bachelor degree 
5= Graduate degree  
   Gender 1=female, 0=male 
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Table 2 Frequencies for Mortgage Choice  
 
Frequency (%) Full Sample Received mortgage info Did not receive mortgage info 
both not sure 50 (10.4) 14 (5.96) 36 (14.69) 
both FRM 173 (36.0) 85 (36.17) 88 (35.92) 
both ARM 19 (4.0) 12 (5.11) 7 (2.86) 
Both Right 143 (29.8) 85 (36.17) 58 (23.67) 
Both Wrong 95 (19.8) 39 (16.60) 56 (22.86) 
        
 
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Full Sample 
 
Received mortgage info 
 
Did not receive mortgage info 
Variables 
N=480 
 
N=235 
 
N=245 
M (SD) 
Frequency 
(%) 
  M (SD) 
Frequency 
(%) 
  M (SD) 
Frequency 
(%) 
Information and knowledge variables 
      
Mortgage information (provided) 
 
235 (49.0) 
      
TILA knowledge Score 2.952(1.390) 
  
2.953(1.433) 
  
2.951(1.351) 
 
0 
 
19 (4.0) 
 
 
12 (5.11) 
 
 
7 (2.86) 
1 71 (14.8) 
 
33 (14.04) 
 
38 (15.51) 
2 86 (17.9) 
 
41 (17.45) 
 
45 (18.37) 
3 104 (21.7) 
 
51 (21.70) 
 
53 (21.63) 
4 138 (28.8) 
 
64 (27.23) 
 
74 (30.20) 
5 62 (12.9) 
 
34 (14.47) 
 
28 (11.43) 
Financial knowledge  3.460(1.591) 
  
3.464(1.594) 
  
3.457(1.593) 
 
0 
 
17 (3.5) 
 
 
6 (2.55) 
 
 
11 (4.49) 
1 46 (9.6) 
 
24 (10.21) 
 
22 (8.98) 
2 79 (16.5) 
 
41 (17.45) 
 
38 (15.51) 
3 78 (16.3) 
 
42 (17.87) 
 
36 (14.69) 
4 122 (25.4) 
 
53 (22.55) 
 
69 (28.16) 
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5 93 (19.4) 
  
44 (18.72) 
  
49 (20.00) 
6 45 (9.4) 
  
25 (10.64) 
  
20 (8.16) 
 
Social learning variables         
Parents or guardians home owners during your 
childhood (yes)  
370 (77.1)  
 
178 (75.74)  
 
192 (78.37) 
  
 
Personal psychology and Social cognitive 
Preference variables 
 
Risk tolerance 
         
Below average 
 
232 (48.3) 
  
117 (49.8) 
  
115 (46.9) 
average 180 (37.5) 
  
89 (37.88) 
  
91 (37.14) 
above average  68 (14.2) 
  
29 (12.34) 
  
39 (15.92) 
Have/had a mortgage         
yes  
 
268(55.8) 
  
141 (52.6) 
  
127 (47.4) 
no  212 (44.2) 
  
94 (44.34) 
  
118 (55.7) 
 
Financial position variables 
      
Household income 
         
$0-20,000 
 
76 (15.8) 
  
33 (14.04) 
  
43 (17.55) 
$20,001-40,000 
 
123 (25.6) 
  
58 (24.68) 
  
65 (26.53) 
$40,001-70,000 
 
149 (31.1) 
  
74 (31.49) 
  
75 (30.61) 
$70,001 and up 
 
132 (27.5) 
  
70 (29.79) 
  
62 (25.31) 
 
Demographic variables 
Age  44.22(15.565) 
  
45.15(16.04) 
  
43.34 (15.07) 
 
Race (White) 
 
388 (80.8) 
  
186 (79.15) 
  
202 (82.45) 
Education 
         
less than high school degree & High school 
degree or equivalent   
112 (23.3) 
  
50 (21.28) 
  
62 (25.31) 
currently in school & associate degree 
 
66 (13.8) 
  
33 (14.04) 
  
33 (13.47) 
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completed some college but no degree 
 
127 (26.5) 
  
62 (26.38) 
  
65 (26.53) 
Bachelor degree 
 
133 (27.7) 
  
72 (30.64) 
  
61 (24.90) 
Graduate degree  
 
42 (8.8) 
  
18 (7.66) 
  
24 (9.80) 
Gender (female) 
 
249 (51.9) 
  
127 (54.04) 
  
122 (49.80) 
       
No statistical difference exists at the 1% and 5% levels for the means between those who did and did not receive the treatment, mortgage information for any descriptive category 
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Table 5: Standardized Regression Weights 
  
Estimate 
Financial Knowledge  <--- Age .219 
Financial Knowledge <--- Education .228 
Financial Knowledge <--- White .195 
Financial Knowledge <--- Prior Mortgage .160 
Financial Knowledge <--- Parents Homeowner .101 
Financial Knowledge <--- Male -.082 
TILA Knowledge <--- Financial Knowledge .360 
TILA Knowledge <--- Prior Mortgage .166 
TILA Knowledge <--- Education .112 
Risk Tolerance <--- Age -.120 
Risk Tolerance <--- Education .082 
Risk Tolerance <--- White -.112 
Risk Tolerance <--- Male -.158 
Risk Tolerance <--- Income .116 
TILA Knowledge <--- Treatment -.022 
TILA Knowledge <--- Male .110 
Table 4: Regression Weights 
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Financial Knowledge  <--- Age .022 .004 4.980 *** 
Financial Knowledge <--- Education .278 .048 5.776 *** 
Financial Knowledge <--- White .780 .165 4.732 *** 
Financial Knowledge <--- Prior Mortgage .510 .142 3.603 *** 
Financial Knowledge <--- Parents Homeowner .379 .151 2.505 .012 
Financial Knowledge <--- Male -.259 .123 -2.102 .036 
TILA Comprehension <--- Financial Knowledge .318 .039 8.107 *** 
TILA Comprehension <--- Prior Mortgage .466 .120 3.889 *** 
TILA Comprehension <--- Education .120 .045 2.693 .007 
Risk Tolerance <--- Age -.008 .003 -2.605 .009 
Risk Tolerance <--- Education .063 .037 1.695 .090 
Risk Tolerance <--- White -.286 .116 -2.465 .014 
Risk Tolerance <--- Male -.317 .089 -3.542 *** 
Risk Tolerance <--- Income .068 .029 2.386 .017 
TILA Knowledge <--- Treatment -.062 .110 -.559 .576 
TILA Knowledge <--- Male .305 .111 2.737 .006 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Risk Tolerance .143 .020 7.300 *** 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Financial Knowledge .177 .014 12.749 *** 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- TILA Comprehension .169 .016 10.741 *** 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Treatment .128 .039 3.265 .001 
*P < .05, ** P < .01., ***P < .001 
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Table 5: Standardized Regression Weights 
  
Estimate 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Risk Tolerance .227 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Financial Knowledge .442 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- TILA Knowledge .373 
Correct Mortgage Choices <--- Treatment .102 
*P < .05, ** P < .01., ***P < .001 
 
 
Figure 1: Path Analysis Model 
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Figure 2: Standardized Regression Weights 
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